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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW—QUESTIONING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS? #METOO.:
RESOLVING THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MIXED-MOTIVE QUESTION BY
ADOPTING THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S PREFERENCE FOR HEARING VICTIMS.
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 2019, nearly two dozen women who had accused Jeffrey Epstein of sexual abuse told their stories in a court of law.1 At the time
they testified, Epstein had been dead for seventeen days.2 The federal prosecutors had already announced their intention to drop the charges against
Epstein—a routine response to the death of a defendant.3 Judge Richard M.
Berman broke routine by ordering a hearing rather than simply dropping the
charges.4 He invited Epstein’s alleged victims to speak at that hearing because he understood that it was important for the women to have their day in
court.5 One woman stated, “The fact that I will never have a chance to face
my predator in court eats away at my soul.”6 Another woman vowed not to
let Epstein or his death silence her voice.7 The hearing was described as a
moment of catharsis for the victims.8 Perhaps inspired by the #MeToo
Movement,9 Judge Berman recognized the alleged victims’ need to speak
and to be heard.10
All too often, the judicial system fails to allow alleged victims their day
in court. Title VII workplace discrimination claims are disproportionately
dismissed at the summary judgment stage of litigation, depriving plaintiffs

1. Ali Watkins, Benjamin Weiser & Amy Julia Harris, Jeffrey Epstein’s Victims, Denied a Trial, Vent Their Fury: ‘He is a Coward,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-hearing-victims.html.
2. Tom Winter, Judge Schedules Hearing for Jeffrey Epstein Victims to Speak, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 21, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department
/judge-schedules-hearing-jeffrey-epstein-victims-speak-n1044876.
3. Watkins, Weiser, & Harris, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Infra, Part II, Section E.
10. Renae Merle & Matt Zapotosky, ‘The Reckoning Must Not End’: Epstein’s Accusers
Urge Prosecutors to Pursue His Enablers, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2019, 6:40 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/at-hearing-to-dismiss-jeffrey-epsteins-chargesthose-who-say-he-abused-them-given-chance-to-be-heard/2019/08/26/35cb03c2-c83a-11e9a1fe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html?utm_source=reddit.com; infra Part II, Section E.
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of the opportunity to be heard in a court of law.11 Disproportionately frequent dismissal of Title VII claims at the summary judgment stage does not
occur because such claims are disproportionately frivolous.12 Scholars have
explored numerous reasons for frequent dismissal, such as judges who are
hostile to discrimination cases13 and a lack of consistent guidelines for
courts.14
Inconsistent application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis15 at the summary judgment stage of mixed-motive discrimination
cases16 plays a significant role as well.17 Nearly fifty years after adoption of
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, circuit courts remain split
on the proper method of applying that analysis to mixed-motive discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage.18 The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits hold fast to the original interpretation and application of McDonnell Douglas, even to mixed-motive discrimination cases.19 The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits apply modified versions of McDonnell Douglas to mixed-motive cases.20 Only the
Sixth Circuit has declined to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis to mixed-motive cases, reasoning that its application would be
11. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 102 (1999); Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 672–73
(2012); Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
111, 112 (2011) (stating that it is more difficult for discrimination plaintiffs to survive pretrial motions).
12. See Stone, supra note 11, at 112.
13. See Chin, supra note 11, at 672.
14. Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 792–93 (2002).
15. Infra Part II, Section B.
16. Infra Part II, Section C. A mixed-motive discrimination case is one in which the
plaintiff demonstrates that the motivation for the negative workplace interaction was at least
partially discriminatory rather than that the motivation for the negative workplace interaction
was entirely discriminatory.
17. See Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1 WM.
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 139, 140 (2010).
18. See Mark R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title VII and Trait Discrimination Plus
One Simple Solution (A Totality of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965,
1044–46 (2009); Beiner, supra note 11, at 95–97; Emden, supra note 17, at 140.
19. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (overruled on other grounds) (rejecting the
argument that Desert Palace overruled McDonnell Douglas and noting that the Desert Palace court had not even mentioned McDonnell Douglas).
20. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); Rachid v. Jack in the
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004); Fogg v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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overly burdensome to mixed-motive plaintiffs and that the Supreme Court
never intended McDonnell Douglas to be “onerous.”21 This circuit split
shows no signs of consensus and demands Supreme Court resolution.22
The #MeToo Movement has created the requisite cultural moment for a
resolution to this circuit split that supports and protects plaintiffs’ rights.
Although few, if any, mixed-motive Title VII discrimination cases may ever
rise to the level of the Epstein case, the victims are no less deserving of the
opportunity to be heard in a court of law than the two dozen women who
spoke at Epstein’s hearing. The spirit of the #MeToo Movement encourages
all victims of abuse, harassment, and discrimination to speak out about their
experiences and demand that the legislature and the judicial system listen to
them.23 It also requires that courts take steps to lessen the obstacles that
stand before victims of discrimination and harassment.
This note argues that the #MeToo Movement has created the cultural
shift required for a pro-plaintiff resolution of the McDonnell Douglas circuit
split, and that the Supreme Court should recognize this cultural shift by
adopting the Sixth Circuit’s decision not to apply McDonnell Douglas at the
summary judgment stage of mixed-motive discrimination cases. Part II of
this note discusses the historical background of Title VII, the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the mixed-motive analysis, summary
judgment, and the #MeToo Movement. Part III addresses the wide circuit
split regarding the appropriate application of McDonnell Douglas to mixedmotive discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage. Part IV argues
that culture and law are intertwined, that the #MeToo Movement is the kind
of cultural movement that supports long-term change, and that the Sixth
Circuit’s approach to McDonnell Douglas best reflects and answers the
#MeToo Movement’s cultural shift.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Title VII and workplace harassment are nebulous subjects that courts
have struggled to fit tidily into a structured framework. This section describes the initial intent and enactment of Title VII; examines the adoption
of the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing such claims; discusses
the creation, codification, and analysis of mixed-motive claims; situates
summary judgment in the Title VII discussion; and outlines the background
of the #MeToo Movement.
21. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008).
22. See Bandsuch, supra note 18, at 1044–46.
23. See Morgan Jerkins, The Way Forward for Me Too, According to Founder Tarana
Burke, VOX (Oct. 15, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/15/
20910298/tarana-burke-morgan-jerkins.
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Title VII History and Purpose

Congress passed Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 Its
purpose was to protect against workplace discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.25 Initially, “sex” was introduced to the
list of protected classes to deter Congress from passing the entire bill.26 Opponents of the Civil Rights Act reasoned that Congress would find protecting sex—which at that time really meant protecting women—as an entire
class was too radical.27 This attempt to thwart Title VII’s enactment was
unsuccessful, and the category of sex has since become one of the most litigated and relied upon aspects of Title VII.28
Legislative history demonstrates the importance Congress placed on
handling pervasive workplace discrimination.29 Although legislators initially
viewed workplace discrimination as a rare occurrence resulting from isolated instances of ill-will, time and experience quickly showed otherwise.30 In
1971, the House of Representatives acknowledged that employment discrimination “is a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon” than originally expected.31 Studies revealed that employment discrimination was a
“problem . . . of ‘systems’ and ‘effects’ rather than simply intentional
wrongs”32 and that “[t]he forms and incidents of discrimination which the
Commission is required to treat are increasingly complex. . . . [T]heir discriminatory nature may not appear obvious at first glance.”33 Just six years
after Title VII passed, Congress strengthened the Act in order to fight harder
against employment discrimination.34
The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that Congress intended Title VII to be sweeping, prohibitive legislation,35 and it has
even further broadened Title VII’s application. In 1986, the Supreme Court
extended sex discrimination claims under Title VII to include sexual harassment, stating that “[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harass24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020).
25. Id.; see Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
26. Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Employment Discrimination—Miller v. Maxwell’s International, Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII and the ADEA,
17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 148 (1995). Contra Caroline Fredrickson, How the Most Important U.S. Civil Rights Law Came to Include Women, 43 HARBINGER 122, 123 (2019) (arguing that female activists worked to have “sex” included in the Civil Rights Act).
27. See Sanborn, supra note 26, at 148.
28. Id.
29. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 2139 (1971).
30. Id. at 2143–44.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521, 524 (1982).
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es a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminates’ because of sex.”36 In 1989, the Supreme Court created the mixedmotive claim, which only requires the plaintiff to prove that an impermissible factor was one factor amongst others motivating a negative workplace
interaction, rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove that the impermissible
factor was the sole factor.37 The court later broadened the mixed-motive
claim by holding that a plaintiff may provide either direct or circumstantial
evidence of discrimination.38 Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently
broadened the application of Title VII to protect more victims of sex discrimination.
Congress provided the framework of Title VII, and the judicial branch
has since attempted to fit employment discrimination claims into a formula
that provides accurate and consistent results. The latter has proven more
difficult than expected, and the result is that Title VII claims—particularly
sex discrimination claims—create confusion.39 The Supreme Court’s adoption of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis was an early attempt to impose a formula on Title VII cases.40
B.

Adoption of the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Analysis

The Supreme Court first adopted the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting analysis for Title VII discrimination cases in 1973, intending to facilitate consistent evaluation of workplace conduct.41 Under McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination.42 The burden then shifts to the defendant, requiring the defendant to offer proof of a legitimate, non-discriminatory motivation for the negative workplace interaction.43 If the defendant does so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff, who must then rebut the defendant’s claim by offering
proof of pretext.44 The Court discussed the pretext prong at length,45 and the
pretext prong would later prove to be the most complex for courts.46 In its
initial discussion, the Court noted that the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that petitioner’s stated reason for [the plaintiff’s] rejec36. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (alteration omitted).
37. Infra Part II, Section C.
38. Infra Part II, Section C.
39. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208 (1993).
40. See Emden, supra note 17, at 159.
41. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
42. Id. at 802.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 804.
45. Id. at 804–06.
46. McGinley, supra note 39, at 208–09.

104

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

tion was in fact pretext.”47 The Court repeated itself just paragraphs later,
advocating for a “full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [the plaintiff’s] rejection were
in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.”48 The Court’s intent
was to provide a structure that would promote fairness and the opportunity
to be heard, but application of McDonnell Douglas has often had the opposite result.49
C.

Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace

The 1989 Supreme Court Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins holding created
a mixed-motive Title VII discrimination claim.50 Ann Hopkins had an excellent work record with Price Waterhouse, and several partners put her name
forward for promotion.51 The partners described Hopkins as incredibly competent and successful, noting that she had played a significant role in a twoyear project that resulted in a twenty-five million dollar contract for Price
Waterhouse.52 Client comments praised her work performance, calling Hopkins “strong and forthright” and “energetic and creative.”53 However, negative comments also described Hopkins as “macho” and “suggested that she
‘overcompensated for being a woman.’”54 The Policy Board voted to put
Hopkins’s promotion on hold and suggested that she would have a better
chance of making partner if she “walk[ed] more femininely, talk[ed] more
femininely, dress[ed] more femininely, [wore] makeup, [had] her hair
styled, and [wore] jewelry.”55
The district court found that it was legitimate for Price Waterhouse to
consider interpersonal skills as a criterion in its promotion decisions, and
further found that Price Waterhouse’s claims about Hopkins’s interpersonal
skills were not a pretext to cover outright discrimination.56 Thus, under
McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse had met its burden of rebutting
Hopkins’s prima facie case by providing a legitimate, non-discriminatory
motivation.57 However, the district court found that impermissible gender
stereotypes had, at least in part, motivated Price Waterhouse’s decision.58
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
Id. at 805.
See Emden, supra note 17, at 140.
490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
Id. at 233–34.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.

2020]

QUESTIONING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

105

The appellate court affirmed, establishing that a workplace action partially
motivated by impermissible factors violates Title VII, and the employer may
escape liability only if it can prove it would have taken the same action
without the influence of the impermissible factor.59 In a plurality opinion,
the Supreme Court adopted the appellate court’s conclusions, establishing
the mixed-motive analysis.60 Congress affirmed the plurality’s holding when
it codified the mixed-motive claim in its 1991 amendment of Title VII.61
After Price Waterhouse, the mixed-motive analysis became an important tenet of Title VII claim assessment, though courts still struggled to
apply it consistently.62 Mixed-motive claims did not mesh well with the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, because McDonnell Douglas’s third prong
required plaintiffs to prove pretext—something that the mixed-motive analysis no longer required. There was no need to prove pretext when an employer responded to allegations by providing some legitimate, nondiscriminatory motivation because mixed-motive claims allowed for the
possibility that employers might have both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motivations.
Additionally, many lower courts interpreted Justice Sandra O’Connor’s
concurrence in Price Waterhouse to require a mixed-motive plaintiff to provide direct evidence of discrimination.63 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the
Supreme Court determined otherwise.64 Catherine Costa filed suit against
her employer, Desert Palace, for sex discrimination.65 She claimed that she
had been stalked, disciplined more harshly than men, “treated less favorably
than men in the assignment of overtime,” and discriminated against by her
employers who “stacked” her disciplinary record and “used or tolerated”
gender-based slurs against her.66 The case went to a jury trial, and at the
conclusion of the trial, the jury received instruction on evaluating whether
Costa had proven her claims. Desert Palace objected to the mixed-motive
jury instructions, noting that they did not specify that the plaintiff must pro-

59. Id. at 237.
60. Id.
61. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-66, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (stating that “[t]he purposes of this act are . . . to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination”); see Bandsuch, supra note 18, at 1001.
62. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
63. Id.; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270–71 (noting that McDonnell Douglas does not
apply where a plaintiff provides direct evidence of discrimination and suggesting that a
mixed-motive plaintiff must provide direct evidence).
64. 539 U.S. at 92.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Id.

106

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

vide “direct evidence,” as required by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, but
not in the text of the 1991 Act.67
The Supreme Court held that the text of the 1991 Act superseded Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurring opinion, and thus there was
no need to analyze her “direct evidence” statements nor to determine if her
concurring opinion was Price Waterhouse’s holding.68 The Supreme Court
then noted that the text of the 1991 Act calls for the plaintiff to “‘demonstrate’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration,” which alone does
not require direct evidence.69 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the
plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence of discrimination and the
jury instruction provided was sufficient.70 Justice O’Connor wrote a separate
concurrence, acknowledging that the 1991 Act allowed for both direct and
circumstantial evidence to prove mixed-motive claims.71
Desert Palace’s holding that plaintiffs could use either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination to prove mixed-motive cases further
confused courts.72 Generally, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis governed where plaintiffs had not provided direct evidence of discrimination.73 After Desert Palace, the distinction between McDonnell Douglas
Title VII cases and mixed-motive Title VII cases blurred even further.74
Consistent, accurate evaluation thus became that much harder at any litigation stage—particularly the summary judgment stage.
D.

The Role of Summary Judgment

Courts disproportionately rule against Title VII plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage of litigation.75 That is not because mixed-motive dis67. Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 98.
69. Id. (alteration omitted).
70. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101–02.
71. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
72. Infra Part III.
73. TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
74. Infra Part III.
75. Stone, supra note 11, at 112 (“In one recently conducted evaluation and analysis of
federal civil cases filed between 1970 and 2006, the authors found that employment discrimination claims that go before a bench are more likely than other kinds of claims to fail, both at
the district court and at the appellate level.”). See generally Beiner, supra note 11, at 102;
Chin, supra note 11, at 672. The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Organized Sec. Life
Ins. Co. v. Munyon, 247 Ark. 449, 467 (1969). A court must view the entire record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that a summary judgment may only be
entered when the pleadings and discovery “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
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crimination cases are disproportionately unsubstantiated. Rather, it is in part
because applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard at the
summary judgment stage increases the burden on Title VII plaintiffs.76 Accurately navigating an intricate and confusing set of standards based on
pleadings and discovery alone is a potentially insurmountable task—
certainly one that the courts have struggled to undertake with any measure
of consistency. Nevertheless, reliance on summary judgment grows.
In 1986, a trio of Supreme Court cases collectively paved the way for
increased reliance on summary judgment.77 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby held
that, at the summary judgment stage, courts must not only determine if there
is a factual dispute but also whether the plaintiff has met the requisite evidentiary burden applicable at trial.78 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett held that a defendant may successfully move for summary judgment if the defendant can
demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence to meet the
evidentiary burden, effectively requiring plaintiffs to “meet the ultimate
burden of proof at the summary judgment stage.”79 In Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Supreme Court determined that
courts may assess matters of intent and motive at the summary judgment
stage and even suggested that the courts should weigh evidence.80 This trio
of cases made it much easier for courts to justify granting summary judgment, even in nuanced, fact-based cases traditionally reserved for juries.81
Following this trio of decisions, the approach to summary judgment
began to change. Federal Judge Patricia Wald wrote in 1998 that summary
judgment, “fueled by the overloaded dockets of the last two decades . . . has
spread swiftly through the underbrush of undesirable cases, taking down
some healthy trees as it goes.”82 The result is that only plaintiffs who can
present a strong case based only on pleadings can hope to survive a motion
for summary judgment.83
76. See generally William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof
Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 361,
380 (1998); Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M. Hedican & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell
Douglas Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 402 (2004); Barrett S. Moore, Shifting the
Burden: Genuine Disputes and Employment Discrimination Standards of Proof, 35 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 113, 121 (2012); Emden, supra note 17, at 140.
77. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see
Emden, supra note 17, at 151.
78. 477 U.S. at 244.
79. McGinley, supra note 39, at 241–42; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 319.
80. 475 U.S. at 596–98; see Beiner, supra note 11, at 93–94; Emden, supra note 17, at
152–53.
81. Beiner, supra note 11, at 94.
82. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1941 (1998).
83. Id. at 1942.
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Summary judgment has taken on an increased role for sex discrimination cases in particular. Prior to the 1990s, courts in the Eighth Circuit repeatedly stated that summary judgment was disfavored in employment discrimination cases because such cases often required intent determinations
and were “inherently fact-based.”84 However, as the 1990s progressed, the
Eighth Circuit courts referenced this disfavor while nevertheless granting
summary judgment with increasing frequency.85 In 2011, the Eighth Circuit
abandoned pretense, stating, “There is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to
the application of summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a
trial.”86 District Judge Milton I. Shadur stated that courts were particularly
prone to granting summary judgment in employee discrimination cases.87 In
a Second Circuit case, Judge Jack Weinstein observed a “robust use” of
summary judgment in sex discrimination cases—a trend he found particularly dangerous.88
As reliance on summary judgment increased, the circuit split regarding
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis controversy became more
significant. The truth of plaintiff experiences can easily get lost in the barren
nature of black text on white paper, and the complexity of relationships and
interactions fades when forced into a clinical formula. The burden this reliance creates for the plaintiff only worsens when courts apply inconsistent
and even contradictory formulas. After Desert Palace, there are at least four
different applications of McDonnell Douglas to mixed-motive claims at the
summary judgment stage of litigation.89 Mixed-motive plaintiffs facing potential summary judgment may find more consistency in a random roll of
the dice than in the judge’s chambers.

84. E.g., Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003); Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment
Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 688 (2012)
(collecting cases); see also Beiner, supra note 11, at 102 (“Judging whether an environment
would or would not be harassing to a ‘reasonable person’ . . . is a particularly difficult job.
Indeed, it is often inappropriate for a court to make such a determination on a motion for
summary judgment.”).
85. Bennett, supra note 84, at 688; see Melvin v. Car-Freshener Corp., 453 F.3d 1000,
1003–04 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J., dissenting).
86. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011).
87. Bennett, supra note 84, at 692.
88. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1998).
89. See Bandsuch, supra note 18, at 1045–46; infra Part III.
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The #MeToo Movement

Overlapping and confusing evidentiary structures currently serve as a
stumbling block to discrimination plaintiffs, but there is momentum for
change. The #MeToo Movement is a cultural movement, spurred on by the
power of social media, that demands justice for victims of sexual harassment, abuse, and assault.90 It exploded onto the global scene in 2017 when
actress Alyssa Milano tweeted the #MeToo hashtag91 and told her thousands
of followers to retweet her message if they had also experienced sexual harassment or violence.92 The Movement has since taken over media, influenced politics, and infiltrated the legal system.93 In just the twenty-four
hours after Alyssa Milano’s initial #MeToo post, over one million people
tweeted or retweeted the #MeToo hashtag.94 Through the #MeToo hashtag,
many people shared stories of sexual harassment and abuse, creating a national conversation and building momentum for change. Many of those stories centered on workplace interactions.95
Harvey Weinstein, a Hollywood mogul who produced numerous
blockbuster movies, faced intense media backlash after Ashley Judd and
Rose McGowan publicly accused him of sexual harassment and sexual assault.96 Following Judd and McGowan’s accusations, a chorus of other
women who had worked with and for Harvey Weinstein told their stories,
connecting them to the #MeToo Movement.97 The picture was bleak. This
man who had achieved professional greatness in the film industry had used
his power, success, and fame as a means to harass, assault, bully, and con90. Jerkins, supra note 23.
91. A hashtag refers to a word or a phrase preceded by a hash sign (#), used on social
media platforms to identify messages pertaining to a specific topic. Hashtags can be used to
promote and organize messages connected to a topic or movement.
92. Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://
twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en; see also Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 230, 231 (2018).
93. Jerkins, supra note 23. See generally Jihad Sheikha, Comment, Punishing Bad Actors: The Expansion of Morals Clauses in Hollywood Entertainment Contracts in the Wake of
the #MeToo Movement, 43 NOVA L. REV. 203, 204 (2019).
94. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Lisa O. Singh & Naomi Mezey, #MeToo as Catalyst: A
Glimpse into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 371, 374 (2019).
95. Jerkins, supra note 23.
96. Tippett, supra note 92, at 230.
97. Id.; Salma Hayek, Harvey Weinstein Is My Monster Too, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/13/opinion/contributors/salma-hayekharvey-weinstein.html; Sara Khorasani, Mixed Messages: Harvey of Hollywood: The Face
that Launched a Thousand Stories, 41 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 103, 104 (2019); Sara
M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete List of the 87 Accusers,
USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017
/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001/.
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trol the women who auditioned for his movies, worked as his assistants, or
wanted to be part of his production company.98
Weinstein’s accusers were hardly the only ones to speak out. Women
in Hollywood began to expose the rampant sexual harassment and abuse that
took place in the power-hungry industry.99 Charlie Rose, a highly respected
television journalist, lost his position at CBS after several women accused
him of sexual harassment, bullying, and indecent behavior in the workplace.100 CBS CEO Les Moonves also lost his job after multiple women accused him of sexual harassment in the workplace.101 Comedian Louis C.K,
politician Al Franken, and actor Kevin Spacey all saw their careers suffer or
end after multiple sexual harassment or assault allegations.102
As #MeToo gained momentum, its influence grew beyond Hollywood.
Roy Moore, a Republican senate candidate from Alabama, ran and lost a
campaign completely overshadowed by the improper sexual conduct allegations against him.103 After approximately 150 women came forward accusing former USA gymnastics team doctor, Larry Nasser, of sexual abuse, he
pled guilty to child pornography charges and was sentenced to sixty years in
prison.104 In 2019, renewed accusations against Jeffrey Epstein surfaced,
though Epstein had previously accepted a plea deal after facing charges for
sexually abusing underage girls.105 In the months prior to Epstein’s July 6th
arrest, many new victims, inspired by #MeToo Movement culture, had be-

98. Khorasani, supra note 97, at 104.
99. See id. at 104–05; Tippett, supra note 92, at 231–32.
100. Kayla Epstein, Former Charlie Rose Makeup Artist Alleges His Talk Show Was a
‘Sexual Hunting Ground’ in New Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019, 2:08 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2019/09/20/former-charlie-rosemakeup-artist-alleges-his-talk-show-was-sexual-hunting-ground-new-lawsuit/.
101. Elahe Izadi & Travis M. Andrews, Former CBS Chairman Les Moonves Fired for
Cause, Will Not Receive Severance in Wake of Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2018, 6:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2018/12/17
/former-cbs-chairman-les-moonves-fired-cause-will-not-receive-severance-wake-sexualmisconduct-allegations/.
102. Katie Warren & Liz Lane, The Powerful Men in the News Accused of Sexual Misconduct, NBC WASH. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/nationalinternational/the-powerful-men-accused-of-sexual-harassment/2076369/.
103. Id.
104. Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar’s Sexual Abuse Victims Finally Get Their Days in
Court, CNN (Jan. 15, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/15/us/larry-nassargymnastics-me-too-sentence/index.html.
105. Mahita Gajanan, Here’s What to Know About the Sex Trafficking Case Against
Jeffrey Epstein, TIME (Jul. 17, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://time.com/5621911/jeffrey-epsteinsex-trafficking-what-to-know/.
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gun to speak out about the longtime abuser’s conduct, making Epstein one
of the most prominent #MeToo cases.106
In December of 2018, Time Magazine announced that “The Silence
Breakers” were collectively Person of the Year.107 “The Silence Breakers”
consisted of the #MeToo activists, both named and unnamed, who came
from all walks of life—celebrities and housekeepers alike.108 They were
unified by the fact that they had spoken out.109 Time Magazine’s choice
demonstrated how influential #MeToo had become, the significance of victims who spoke out, and the nation’s willingness to hear all victims of sexual discrimination and abuse.
The #MeToo Movement created a “watershed moment,” and it was not
long before the Movement had a legal branch.110 On January 1, 2018, The
New York Times ran an open letter announcing “Time’s Up,” an initiative
created by three hundred women in Hollywood.111 Time’s Up included (1) a
legal defense fund to help protect underprivileged women against sexual
harassment or abuse and the consequences of reporting it, (2) proposed legislation to penalize companies that allow persistent sexual misconduct, (3) a
plan to promote gender parity in male-dominated fields, such as the film
industry, and (4) a call for women attending the Golden Globes to wear
black as a method of raising awareness.112 Time’s Up’s ultimate goal was to
make sure that women who traditionally did not have voices in society were
heard.113 Since its creation in 2018, Time’s Up has helped pay legal fees for
victims of harassment and discrimination and promoted important legislative changes.114
Once #MeToo branched into legislation, it transcended a mere cultural
movement and began to fuel long-term change. One of the most prominent
#MeToo legal discussion centers on non-disclosure agreements that powerful employers require employees to sign in order to keep them silent.115 It
106. Id.; Katie Reilly, How the #MeToo Movement Helped Make New Charges Against
Jeffrey Epstein Possible, TIME (Jul. 9, 2019, 7:49 PM), https://time.com/5621958/jeffreyepstein-charges-me-too-movement//.
107. Meghan D. Maria, The Secret Message Behind that Elbow on Time’s Person of the
Year Cover, REFINERY29 (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2017
/12/184096/time-2017-person-of-the-year-cover-elbow-anonymous-woman.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Khorasani, supra note 97, at 119.
111. Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-holly
wood-women-sexual-harassment.html.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.; Tippett, supra note 92, at 234–35.
115. Tippett, supra note 92, at 234–35.
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was a logical first foray into legislation, given that Weinstein, the man
whose conduct formed the basis for the #MeToo movement, had long used
non-disclosure agreements to hide his abusive behavior.116 Since the #MeToo Movement, multiple states have considered reforms of their nondisclosure agreement laws, intending to better protect employees who speak
out against workplace harassment.117
Scholars also predict that the #MeToo Movement may alter the way
that courts define particular sexual harassment terms, such as “severe and
pervasive.”118 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vison, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that conduct qualifies as “harassment” when it is so “severe or
pervasive” that it alters the terms or conditions of employment.119 However,
“severe and pervasive” is a vague term that courts often interpret narrowly
and against the plaintiff’s interests.120
Legal scholars have hypothesized about why “severe and pervasive”
has become a legal barrier. One suggestion is that the courts’ interpretation
of “severe and pervasive” stems from a few key early cases that provide an
abundance of legal justification for judges who wish to dismiss future harassment cases.121 Another explanation is that courts are hesitant to cross the
line into interfering with normal workplace activity.122
The Eighth Circuit has observed that the Supreme Court has indicated
that teasing, offhand comments, gender-related jokes, and “sporadic use of
abusive language,” do not usually rise to the level of sexual harassment.123
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit concluded that behavior might be “vile or
inappropriate” without “ris[ing] to the level of actionable sexual harassment.”124 In 2009, the Eighth Circuit held that a supervisor who rubbed an
employee’s back and shoulders, called her “baby doll,” complained that she
didn’t want to be “one of his girls,” suggested that she go to bed with him,
and implied to her that “getting along with him” would be good for her career had not engaged in actionable sexual harassment.125

116. Id.
117. Current non-disclosure law and proposed changes to non-disclosure law are beyond
the scope of this Note. The topic, however, is an important one that closely connects with the
importance and power of allowing victims to be heard. For a full discussion of non-disclosure
law and the #MeToo Movement, see Tippett, supra note 92, beginning at 255.
118. Tippett, supra note 92, at 237.
119. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
120. See Beiner, supra note 14, at 797–802.
121. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 37–38 (2017).
122. Id.
123. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 2016)
124. Id. at 1058.
125. Anderson v. Family Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc., 579 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Whether the reason for these decisions is animus toward sexual harassment claims or confusion as to what crosses the line into dictating civility, there is clearly a disconnect between what courts consider harassment
and what the average person would consider harassment.126 The Supreme
Court has stated that courts must evaluate sexual harassment claims in light
of “social context.”127 The #MeToo Movement’s entirely new social context
has great potential to sway courts to abandon precedent and redefine actionable sexual harassment.
Although the #MeToo Movement has already begun to inspire legal
change, its potential will be stunted if the legal system does not harness the
power of the Movement to resolve the contradictory and overlapping standards courts use to evaluate Title VII claims. As long as the courts remain
split on how to determine if the plaintiff gets into the courtroom, there can
be little true advancement. The Supreme Court should consider the cultural
shift associated with the #MeToo Movement when resolving the McDonnell
Douglas circuit split and adopt the Sixth Circuit’s approach that allows more
plaintiffs into court.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
After Desert Palace, there is great disparity in how the circuits analyze
mixed-motive Title VII cases at the summary judgment stage. The Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits have held that Desert Palace had no impact on the
McDonnell Douglas summary judgment analysis for mixed-motive Title VII
cases.128 The Fifth Circuit has applied a modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to mixed-motive case.129 The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have attempted to find the middle ground, allowing plaintiffs to proceed under
McDonnell Douglas or provide direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.130 The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have avoided deciding
whether Desert Palace has altered the summary judgment analysis for
mixed-motive cases,131 and the Second and Seventh Circuits have not yet
considered the issue.132 The Sixth Circuit, an outlier, has held that, after Desert Palace, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis does not apply
126. See Beiner, supra note 14, at 793.
127. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc, 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998).
128. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (overruled on other grounds).
129. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
130. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005);
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Fogg v. Gonzalez, 492
F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
131. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 399 (6th Cir. 2008).
132. Emden, supra note 17, at 153 n.110.
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to mixed-motive Title VII cases at the summary judgment stage.133 The following section discusses each approach, beginning with the most burdensome to the plaintiff and ending with the least burdensome to the plaintiff.
A.

Holding Fast: The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits

The Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace did not alter the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in any way.134 The court reasoned that Desert
Palace involved a post-trial jury instruction about mixed-motive cases—not
a summary judgment issue—and did not reference or even cite to McDonnell Douglas.135 While the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law standards typically reflect each
other, it noted that the context for the two processes is significantly different.136 At the judgment as a matter of law stage, the court must consider
whether the presence of multiple motives, both legitimate and illegitimate,
defeats the plaintiff’s case,137 whereas at the summary judgment stage, the
only appropriate consideration is whether there is sufficient evidence of a
discriminatory motive.138 Given these two different contexts, the Eighth Circuit held that Desert Palace did not apply to summary judgment analysis.139
In Cooper v. Southern Co., the Eleventh Circuit relies on the same arguments that the Eighth Circuit made regarding the relationship—or lack
thereof—between Desert Palace and McDonnell Douglas.140 The Cooper
plaintiffs had argued that Desert Palace overruled McDonnell Douglas and
placed a heavier burden on defendant to prove that it would have still acted
without the discriminatory motive.141 The court rejected this argument, stating that Desert Palace narrowly addressed jury instructions in mixed-motive
cases, that Desert Palace had not referred to McDonnell Douglas, and that
for some time after Desert Palace, the Eleventh Circuit had continued to
apply McDonnell Douglas at the summary judgment stage without contradiction.142 Though the court’s discussion of this issue is brief and hidden in a
footnote of a disparate-impact case, its reasoning indicates that the Eleventh
Circuit aligns with the Eighth Circuit, concluding that Desert Palace did not
alter the application of McDonnell Douglas.143
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

White, 533 F.3d at 400.
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 398 (6th Cir. 2008).
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Thus, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits remain stalwarts of McDonnell
Douglas, imposing a heavy burden on plaintiffs at the summary judgment
stage. As a result, fewer plaintiffs have the opportunity to be heard in a court
of law, to put their case to a jury, or to face those whom they accuse.144 In
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis routinely keeps plaintiffs out of the courtroom.145
B.

Middle Ground and Modification: The Fourth, Ninth, D.C., and Fifth
Circuits

The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits apply “middle ground” versions
of McDonnell Douglas, all taking a similar approach.146 The Fifth Circuit
has modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis for mixed-motive claims,
blending McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse into one formula.147
This subsection will first address the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits middle-ground application of McDonnell Douglas post-Desert Palace, then
address the Fifth Circuit’s modified approach to the same.
1.

McDonnell Douglas Middle Ground

The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits interpret the Desert Palace holding to require that plaintiffs present either direct or circumstantial evidence
of discrimination or proceed under the McDonnell Douglas pretext formula.148 In April of 2002, Rovilma Diamond, an African-American woman,
filed a claim against Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company for
wrongful denial of promotion and retaliation.149 When the court granted
summary judgment against Diamond, she appealed, arguing that Desert
Palace had done away with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis at the summary judgment stage and that courts must analyze all Title VII
claims as mixed-motive claims.150
The Fourth Circuit rejected Diamond’s reasoning and affirmed its postDesert Palace precedent, which allows plaintiffs to survive summary judgment by either (1) providing “direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a
144. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 912 (2005).
145. Bandsuch, supra note 18, at 1044–45 (citing McGinley, supra note 39, at 229).
146. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005);
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Fogg v. Gonzalez, 492
F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See generally Emden, supra note 17, at 164–66.
147. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
148. See Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318; McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1122; Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451.
See generally Emden, supra note 17, at 165.
149. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 313–14.
150. Id. at 316.
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genuine issue of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor . . . motivated the employer’s . . . decision” or (2) “proceed[ing] under the McDonnell Douglas ‘pretext’ framework.”151 Unlike the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Desert Palace had an effect on
the analysis of mixed-motive cases at the summary judgment stage.152 However, rather than abandoning or modifying the McDonnell Douglas structure
itself, the Fourth Circuit modified the alternative “direct evidence” requirement to include circumstantial evidence.153 The Ninth Circuit has adopted
the same analysis with the same language.154 The D.C. Circuit has also
adopted, in practical effect, the same analysis structure.155
This middle-ground approach incorporates the Desert Palace holding
into its summary judgment analysis. The result provides more opportunity
for plaintiffs to raise an issue of fact at the summary judgment stage than the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches.156 However, it leaves intact the
McDonnell Douglas structure, to which the court still defaults if the employer rebuts the plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination with some legitimate,
non-discriminatory motivation.157
2.

The Fifth Circuit and McDonnell Modification

The Fifth Circuit modified McDonnell Douglas itself.158 In 2004, the
Fifth Circuit considered Ahmed Rachid’s age discrimination case, which he
had lost at the summary judgment stage.159 The Fifth Circuit’s holding
blended McDonnell Douglas with Price Waterhouse.160 The court noted that
Desert Palace had made it more difficult to distinguish between the mixedmotive analysis and the McDonnell Douglas analysis; thus one structure that
accommodated both analyses was most appropriate.161 In the modified structure, the first two prongs of McDonnell Douglas remain the same—the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and the defendant must offer some
legitimate, non-discriminatory motivation for the negative employment action.162 At the third prong, the plaintiff may establish either (1) that the de151. Id. at 318.
152. See Emden, supra note 17; Bandsuch, supra note 18; Diamond, 416 F.3d at 317–18.
153. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318.
154. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).
155. Fogg v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
156. See Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318.
157. See id.
158. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
159. Id. at 307, 311 (concluding that the mixed-motive analysis applied to ADEA claims
as well as Title VII claims).
160. Id. at 312; See Emden, supra note 17, at 164–65.
161. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 310, 312.
162. Id. at 312.
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fendant’s proffered motivation is a pretext or (2) that “the defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct.”163 If the plaintiff
follows the second option, the defendant must then prove that it would have
taken the same negative employment action even without the prohibited
motivation.164
Whether the Fifth Circuit’s approach is any more lenient for plaintiffs
than the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit’s approach is difficult to ascertain.
Both approaches attempt to incorporate the Desert Palace holding into established precedent, but neither are willing to go so far as to say that the
McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer applicable to mixed-motive
cases. Only the Sixth Circuit has adopted that approach.165
C.

The Outlier: The Sixth Circuit

In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the Sixth Circuit abandoned
McDonnell Douglas at the summary judgment stage of Title VII mixedmotive cases because the three-prong analysis was “onerous.”166 The court
reasoned that imposing such a burdensome standard on plaintiffs contradicted legislative intent and judicial precedent.167 The Sixth Circuit noted that
“since Desert Palace, the federal courts of appeals have, without much, if
any, consideration of the issue, developed widely differing approaches to the
question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII
mixed-motive cases.”168 Prior to White, the Sixth Circuit had side-stepped
several opportunities to decide how Desert Palace affected its Title VII
mixed-motive case precedents.169 However, the White majority opinion
demonstrated careful consideration of the issue and a confident ruling.170
The Sixth Circuit’s primary motivation for abandoning McDonnell
Douglas for mixed-motive Title VII cases was that the burden-shifting analysis simply was not useful nor relevant to assessing whether the plaintiff had
provided evidence of a discriminatory motive.171 Not only had Desert Palace blurred the line between the mixed-motive analysis and the McDonnell
Douglas analysis, but the very nature of the mixed-motive case eradicated
the need for any pretext evidence at the summary judgment stage. 172 All the
163.
164.
165.
166.
399.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008).
Bandsuch, supra note 18, at 1045; Emden, supra note 17, at 155; White, 533 F.3d at
White, 533 F.3d at 399–401.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
See id. at 400.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 401.
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plaintiff is required to do in a mixed-motive case is provide sufficient evidence—direct or circumstantial—that an illegitimate motive existed.173 If the
plaintiff does so, no burden-shifting is required and summary judgment is
not appropriate.174
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is so simple that it gives a moment’s
pause. The court engaged in none of the parsing of intermediate evidentiary
burdens and comparisons of different standards that other circuits did when
explaining why and how McDonnell Douglas is still appropriate for mixedmotive cases. Rather, the court clearly and concisely got to the heart of the
issue—there is no place for discussions of pretext in mixed-motive cases
and forcing that discussion is overly burdensome to the plaintiff.175 The
Sixth Circuit well demonstrates that the tangled knot of evidentiary burdens
and analysis structures obstructs the ultimate goal—to allow plaintiffs who
have demonstrated genuine issues of material facts to speak in a court of
law.176 The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning both reflects the legislative intent originally behind Title VII and the cultural shift toward hearing victims that the
#MeToo movement has created.
IV. CULTURAL MOMENTUM AND LEGAL CHANGE
Like the Sixth Circuit, proponents of the #MeToo Movement argue for
erring on the side of hearing victims. This cultural movement has already
bled into the legal field, and it has the potential to continue to demand legal
change. To demonstrate the legal impact cultural movements can have, this
section first examines the relationship between culture and law, arguing that
a cultural shift must occur if legal change is going to have practical effect. It
then argues that the #MeToo Movement is the kind of social movement that
can support legal change. Finally, this section argues that the #MeToo
Movement has created a cultural shift that demands and can support adopting the Sixth Circuit’s pro-victim approach as a resolution of the McDonnell
Douglas circuit split.
A.

Courts and Culture

For change to be meaningful, the law and culture must work in tandem.
In fact, within the context of true social change, the two are difficult to sepa-

173.
174.
175.
176.

White, 533 F.3d at 401–02.
Id.
Id. at 400.
See generally id.
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rate.177 Law professors Gerald Torres and Lani Guinier have written extensively about the relationship between social movements and legal change,
concluding that without a cultural shift, true lawmaking does not occur.178
Torres and Guinier developed the term “demosprudence,” a concept that
claims that “social movement activism is as much a source of law as are
statutes and judicial decisions.”179 Torres and Guinier do not argue that social movement activism influences lawmaking—rather, they argue that social movement is an intrinsic part of lawmaking because it changes “the
sense of what is practically possible and the sense of what is possible to imagine.”180 In other words, lawmaking occurs when a change in the rules
brings the law in line with a cultural shift that has already taken place.181 To
look more closely at this relationship between culture and lawmaking, this
Note will briefly contrast the progression of African American rights and
LGBTQ rights.182
The development of African American rights demonstrates that legal
change without cultural support is largely ineffective. After the Civil War,
the Reconstruction Congress passed legislation that abolished slavery, provided citizenship regardless of race, and guaranteed voting rights regardless
of race.183 Additionally, Congress adopted a series of civil rights laws intended to undermine pervasive racism and promote equality.184 Southern
states resisted these laws, adopting systems that allowed them to retain their
racist constructs despite the new legislation—systems like sharecropping

177. Stacey L. Sobel, Cultural Shifting at Warp Speed: How the Law, Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 143,
144 (2015).
178. Id. at 152.
179. Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135, 135–36 (2007).
180. Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We
the People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1068–69 (2012) (quoting JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 11 (2011).
181. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006).
182. The following discussions of both the African American and LGBTQ civil rights
movements are not intended nor asserted to be comprehensive. These discussions are overviews, intended only to establish the different outcomes when there is or is not cultural support for a legal change. Given that both the African American and LGBTQ civil rights
movements are outside the scope of this article, the treatment of each is purely a summation
that unfortunately glosses over the struggles, successes, and failures of each. The following
discussion is not intended to ignore the fact that much is left to be done before either the
African American or LGBTQ communities enjoy full, unqualified equality.
183. See John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1209, 1211 (1997).
184. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1437 n.213 (1992).
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and segregation.185 Despite the fact that the laws had changed, these discriminatory systems persisted for more than seventy years because there was no
cultural support in the South for the new laws. Society and the courts ignored, actively circumvented, and delegitimized the laws that Congress had
passed.186 It was not until the 1950s and 1960s, when powerful activism began a cultural shift toward tolerance and inclusion, that effective civil rights
lawmaking occurred. During the Reconstruction era, lawmakers attempted
to legislate tolerance and inclusion that society—Southern society in particular—was not willing to accept, effectively making the laws moot.
Conversely, the LGBTQ movement demonstrates that cultural change
can accelerate legal change by making a previously invisible, criminalized
group of people so visible that legal change rapidly follows. In the 1990s, a
cultural shift in the way that people viewed LGBTQ people occurred, and as
a result, courts began to reason differently about LGBTQ rights.187 Multiple
LGBTQ-favorable legal decisions followed, beginning to change the landscape of LGBTQ rights. In 1983, approximately seventy-five percent of
people stated that they did not know anyone who was LGBTQ.188 Thirty
years later, eighty-seven percent of people said they did know a person who
is LGBTQ.189 This increase in exposure to LGBTQ people has mirrored an
increase in acceptance of LGBTQ lifestyles, and the Supreme Court’s decisions have mirrored that increase in acceptance.190 In 1986, when the United
States Supreme Court ruled that homosexual sodomy was not a protected
right, just thirty-two percent of Americans believed that consensual homosexual sex should be legal.191 In 2003, when the Supreme Court reversed
that decision, more than sixty percent of Americans already believed consensual homosexual sex should be legal.192 Similarly, in 2014, public support for same-sex marriage rose to an all-time high, just one year before the
Court’s Obergefell holding created marriage equality.193
These two examples clearly demonstrate that cultural and legal advancement must occur together, and change is swifter and more effective
185. See john a. powell & Caitlin Watt, Corporate Prerogative, Race, and Identity Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 885, 895 (2011).
186. See generally Sobel, supra note 177, at 154.
187. Sobel, supra note 177, at 164–75.
188. Id. at 176.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Frank Newport, Public Shifts to More Conservative Stance on Gay Rights, GALLUP
(July 30, 2003), https://news.gallup.com/poll/8956/public-shifts-more-conservative-stancegay-rights.aspx.
192. Id.
193. Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, GALLUP
(May 21, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches-newhigh.aspx.
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when they do. These examples support Torres and Guinier’s proposition that
social change impacts what people believe to be possible.194 Attempting to
enforce laws that do not reflect the culture of a society inevitably results in
that society finding a way around or ignoring the spirit of those laws. However, when changing the rule brings the law in line with a true cultural shift,
real change takes place.
B.

The #MeToo Movement Has Opened the Door to Legal Change

The #MeToo Movement has increased the visibility of discrimination
and sexual assault victims, generating public support for holding victimizers
accountable. It has begun to chip away at the shame that victims have often
felt about telling their story, and it has normalized holding abusers accountable. #MeToo has become a household term, permeating the national consciousness through the power of social media,195 working its way into political discussions, and taking on legal force. It is a cultural movement that can
support legal change.
Thomas B. Stoddard identified four factors that must be present in a
social movement before it can effect true change.196 Those factors are “(1) A
change that is . . . broad or profound; (2) Public awareness of that change;
(3) A general sense of the legitimacy (or validity) of the change; and (4) . . .
continuous enforcement of the change.”197 Stoddard’s assertion is wellfounded, as social movements can at times be fleeting, socially unpopular,
or unenforceable. Such movements may not be able to inspire or support a
rule change. The #MeToo Movement easily meets Stoddard’s four factors.
The #MeToo Movement has created “broad or profound” change because it has changed what victims of sexual discrimination, harassment, or
violence collectively believe that they have to endure. This is evidenced by
the number of people who continue to speak out and face potential backlash
because they know that they do not have to suffer alone in silence. Instead,
there is an assurance that if they speak out, society will validate their protest
and take action.
The media focus of the #MeToo Movement ensures that there is widespread “public awareness” of the change that has occurred. Although some
criticize social media activists, on the whole social media platforms provide
a voice to those who otherwise would not have the resources or the opportunity to be heard.198 #MeToo’s potential for creating change is largely root194. Torres & Guinier, supra note 180, at 1068–69 (2012).
195. Williams, Singh & Mezey, supra note 94, at 377.
196. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 978 (1997).
197. Id.
198. Williams, Singh & Mezey, supra note 94, at 377–78.
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ed in the conversation that has developed and perpetuates on social media
between people of different genders, races, backgrounds, and socioeconomic
status.199 Not only is the public aware of the #MeToo Movement’s message,
people are actively interacting with the Movement—even if only by scrolling through their social media feeds and reading the stories of their friends
and family members.200
As with all cultural movements, there are some who question the #MeToo Movement’s legitimacy.201 Some say that #MeToo has spun out of control and is doing more harm than good.202 Some say that women who speak
out about harassment in the workplace simply make men afraid to interact
with women at work—and that the consequence will be fewer women in the
business sector.203 Some say that the #MeToo Movement is merely a political agenda in disguise.204 #MeToo has its naysayers, but it is difficult to argue that the desire to protect victims from sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual violence is not legitimate. The overwhelming response
to #MeToo accusers is support and encouragement, demonstrating the legitimacy Stoddard requires.205 Hashtags such as “#BelieveWomen,” “#BelieveSurvivors,” and “#WhyIDidn’tReport” have dominated social media.206
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Men and women alike have openly praised victims who speak out for having the courage to inspire others to do the same.207
Finally, the #MeToo Movement is enforcing the change that is occurring. Whether or not it is always popular, people continue to tell their stories
of victimization. Harvey Weinstein, whose victims started the present incarnation of the #MeToo Movement, has been convicted of a criminal sex act
in the first degree and rape in the third degree.208 His victims continue to
speak out against him, bringing the #MeToo momentum full circle to hold
accountable the man who terrorized Hollywood for decades. In 2018, a jury
convicted Bill Cosby of sexual assault, proving “that there is accountability.”209 In 2017, pop icon Taylor Swift sued radio DJ David Mueller for lifting her skirt and touching her inappropriately.210 She requested one symbolic
dollar in damages, and she spoke bluntly in the courtroom, refusing to be
intimidated by the tactics of the defendant’s lawyer.211 The president of the
Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network stated that Swift’s principled
claim was “a great demonstration to other victims that there is strength in
coming forward and pursing [sic] justice.”212 Whether by costing a perpetrator his career, convicting him in court, or demanding a dollar as a symbolic
admission of guilt, accusers are enforcing change and people are taking notice.
Thus, the #MeToo Movement meets Stoddard’s four factors social
movements must have to effect true change.213 The discussion surrounding
sexual harassment and discrimination has permanently changed. Even
though these issues are far from resolved and there is much need for further
advancement, there is also now a new awareness and acceptance that prom207. E.g.,Tom Philip, Terry Crews Delivered a Powerful Testimony on Sexual Assault,
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ises progress. Even the language surrounding sexual harassment has
changed, incorporating social media hashtags and new terminology. Most
importantly, it has become harder to silence victims who want to be heard.
They can speak in the public sphere, and they ought to be able to speak in
court as well.
C.

The Court Must Walk Through the Open Door

Adopting the Sixth Circuit’s approach to McDonnell Douglas at the
summary judgment stage of mixed-motive discrimination cases changes the
rules to reflect the cultural change that has already occurred. The Sixth Circuit’s approach strips away the overly-complex, blurred, and overlapping
formulas that have developed over years of ad hoc modifications. It opens
the courtroom to discrimination plaintiffs so that they can be heard. The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches are outdated—reflective of a culture that no longer dominates society. The middle ground and modified
McDonnell Douglas approaches make advancements but still do not fully
answer the cultural demand for hearing victims. Adopting the Sixth Circuit’s
White holding should be part of the national answer to the #MeToo Movement’s demand for alleged victims to be given greater access to justice.
Embracing the #MeToo Momentum would not be a step away from
what Congress and the courts originally intended. Rather, adopting the Sixth
Circuit’s White holding would bring greater alignment with legislative intent
and judicial precedent.214 The legislative intent behind Title VII was always
to eradicate workplace harassment and provide a lenient and allencompassing avenue of relief for victims of workplace discrimination, harassment, and assault.215 The Supreme Court has consistently expanded Title
VII’s scope, with Congress’s express support.216 Title VII is intended to be a
broad umbrella under which plaintiffs can find shelter—not a narrow opening through which only a few can fit. Similarly, McDonnell Douglas was
never meant to be a roadblock for plaintiffs, 217 and the #MeToo Movement
should provide the cultural momentum required to push the obstacle out of
the way.
V. CONCLUSION
Though it was never intended to be, McDonnell Douglas is a burdensome standard for Title VII mixed-motive plaintiffs. The #MeToo Move214.
215.
216.
217.
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ment has created the kind of cultural shift that can support a sweeping
change in the law, eradicating the McDonnell Douglas burden at the summary judgment stage of mixed-motive cases and granting discrimination
plaintiffs greater access to the courts. This is the cultural moment for the
Supreme Court to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s White holding and open the
courtroom door to plaintiffs.
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